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SUMMARYOF ARGUMENT 
Judgments by default have long been disfavored under Utah law. As a 
default certificate is merely "a first step" on the path towards a default judgment, 
Utah appellate courts have instructed that the "good cause" standard of Rule 55(c) 
be applied liberally and that all doubts be resolved in favor of the defaulting party. 
In this case, the trial court failed to apply the factors most courts find 
relevant in determining whether "good cause" has been shown. Instead, the trial 
court applied a rigid time-based test, and concluded that a nine (9) month delay in 
answering Plaintiffs Amended Complaint was simply too long to constitute "good 
cause." Under the circumstances of this case, Big Bubba's submits that the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING BIG BUBBA'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
CERTIFICATE. 
There is no dispute that trial courts have broad discretion in deciding 
whether to set aside defaults. See Miller v. Brocksmith. 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). However, Utah appellate courts have been careful to remind that a 
trial court's discretion in considering whether to set aside a default, whether it be a 
default judgment under Rule 60(b) or a default certificate under Rule 55(c), is not 
without limitation. See Davis v. Goldsworthv (Davis D. 2008 UT App 145, flO, 
1 
184 P.3d 626; Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75, f 9, 11 P.3d 277 (explaining that a trial 
court's discretion, though broad, "is not unlimited"). 
A. The Abuse Of Discretion Standard Under Rule 55(c). 
In her brief, Plaintiff argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Big Bubba's Motion because its decision was not "arbitrary, capricious, or 
whimsical." (PL's Br., pp. 5-6.) Quoting from the case, Hendry v. Schneider. 116 
F.3d 446, 449 (10th Cir. 1997), Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he trial court abuses its 
discretion in determining whether there is 'good cause' if its decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or whimsical." (PL's Br., p. 5.) Plaintiffs reliance on Hendry is 
misplaced. 
Hendry involved a question of whether there was "good cause" for the 
plaintiffs failure to serve the defendant with a summons and complaint within the 
time period required under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Citing 
to the case, Cox v. Sandia Corp., 941 F.2d 1124, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991), the Hendry 
court explained that a trial court abuses its discretion in determining whether there 
is "good cause" if its decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical." Hendry. 
116F.3dat449.1 
1
 The version of Rule 4 applied by the court in Hendry provided: 
Summons: Time Limit for Service. If a service of the summons and 
complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the 
filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was 
2 
Hendry did not involve a determination of whether "good cause" had been 
established under Rule 55(c). A review of the Hendry decision and the authority it 
cites makes it clear that its analysis of what constitutes an abuse of discretion in 
determining "good cause" was limited to the "good cause" referred to in Rule 4 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not Rule 55(c). See icL at 449. See also. 
Cox. 941 F.2d at 1125 ("The legislative history of [Rule 4] cites a defendant's 
evasion of service as the sole example of 'good cause.'") 
In the context of Rule 60(b), Utah appellate courts have stated, "[a]s a 
threshold matter, a court's ruling must be 'based on adequate findings of fact' and 
'on the law.'" Lund. 2000 UT 75,19 (quoting May v. Thompson. 677 P.2d 1109, 
1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)). "A decision premised on flawed legal 
conclusions, for instance, constitutes an abuse of discretion." Lund. 2000 UT 75, 
f 9.2 The Utah Supreme Court has explained that the equitable nature of the rule 
required cannot show good cause why such service was not made 
within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant 
without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such 
party or upon motion. 
Hendry. 116 F.3d at 447, n.l (emphasis added). 
2
 This is consistent with the approach taken by courts applying the federal 
counterpart of Rule 55(c). See e.g.. Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading 
Co., 627 F.2d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Absence of record indication that 
proper standards were applied in refusing to set aside a default has been held 
sufficient in itself to warrant reversal."); Coon v. Grenier. 867 F.2d 73, 78 (1st 
Cir. 1989) ("Judicial discretion is necessarily broad - but it is not absolute. 
3 
provides further limits on the trial court's discretion. See id. at |10 (quoting 11 
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857, at 257-58 (2d 
ed. 1995) ("based on the remedial nature of Rule 60(b), the discretion of the 
district court to deny a motion for relief is limited")). 
While few Utah appellate courts have had occasion to consider whether a 
trial court's decision to set aside a default under Rule 55(c) constituted an abuse of 
discretion, those that have often refer to prior appellate decisions applying Rule 
60(b). See e ^ , Davis L 2008 UT App 145, TJ10; Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 
332, 244 P.3d 391. However, this does not mean that the two rules, or the abuse of 
discretion standards applied to them, are the same. 
In Roth, this Court considered whether a trial court had abused its discretion 
in vacating a default certificate under Rule 55(c). Referring to prior decisions 
involving default judgments under Rule 60(b), the Roth court stated: 
Speaking of a default judgment, our supreme court has stated that a 
trial court should 'incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to 
the end that the party may have a hearing.' Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 
75, ^10, 11 P.3d 277 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is 
because 'if default is issued when a party genuinely is mistaken to a 
point where, absent such mistake, default would not have occurred, 
the equity side of the court would grant relief.' May v. Thompson, 
677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). Thus, 'it is quite 
Abuse occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, 
when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and no improper 
factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them.") 
(additional citations omitted). 
4 
uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where there is a reasonable justification or excuse 
for the . . . failure . . . and timely application is made to set it aside.' 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, \63, 150 P. 3d 480 (omissions in 
original) (quoting Lund, 2000 UT75, yi, 11 P.3d 277). 
2010 UT App 332, |17 (emphasis original). The court went on to hold that the 
principles supporting the setting aside of default judgments are even stronger when 
appellate courts review a trial court's decision concerning the setting aside of a 
default certificate. See Roth. 2010 UT App 332, |17 ("Inasmuch as a default 
certificate is merely a 'first step' towards obtaining a default judgment, we hold 
that these principles apply a fortiori to appellate review of a trial court's order 
setting aside a default certificate") (emphasis original; internal citation omitted). 
See also. Coon, 867 F.2d at 73 (explaining that considerations favoring the 
resolution of actions on their merits "are at their zenith in the Rule 55(c) milieu"). 
B. "Excusable Neglect" Under Rule 60(b) Is Not The Same 
As "Good Cause" Under Rule 55(c). 
Referring to "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b) and "good cause" under 
Rule 55(c) as though they were one and the same, Plaintiff argues that the trial 
court did not err by refusing to consider other factors indicative of "good cause" 
once it concluded that "excusable neglect" had not been established. (PL's Br., pp. 
7-8.) Relying on the case Miller v. Brocksmith. 825 P.2d 690 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), Plaintiff asserts that if excusable neglect cannot be shown, then there is no 
need for a trial court to consider other factors, such as whether the defendant can 
5 
demonstrate a meritorious defense. (PL's Br., p. 7.) Plaintiffs application of 
Miller blurs the distinctions between Rule 60(b) and Rule 55(c) and does not 
reflect the current approach adopted by a majority of courts, including this Court, 
in applying the "good cause" standard of Rule 55(c). 
In Miller, the defendant attempted to have a default set aside under Rule 
55(c) in a lawsuit seeking the annulment of an adoption decree. The trial court 
denied the defendant's motion. On appeal, a panel of this Court stated that 
"[w]hile Rule 55(c) distinguishes between the setting aside of a default and the 
setting aside of a default judgment under Rule 60(b), 'the factors described in Rule 
60(b) are relevant to [a] determination of whether defendant has shown 'good 
cause."" Miller. 825 P.2d at 693 (additional citations omitted). The court 
explained that the factors to be considered include whether the defendant's failure 
constitutes excusable neglect and whether the defendant has presented a 
meritorious defense to the action. See id. Referencing prior decisions involving 
Rule 60(b), the court went on to explain that "the question of a meritorious defense 
arises only if excusable neglect has been shown." IcL (citing State v. Musselman. 
667 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1983); Board v. Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Cox. 
384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963)).3 
Following Miller, there was some uncertainty over whether a finding of no 
"excusable neglect" precluded the consideration of other factors relevant in 
establishing "good cause" under Rule 55(c), such as the existence of a meritorious 
6 
The Miller court's recognition of the Rule 60(b) factors (e.g., "excusable 
neglect") as being "relevant" in determining whether "good cause" exists under 
Rule 55(b) does not mean that the two standards are the same or that a lack of 
"excusable neglect" precludes a finding of "good cause." Decisions by courts 
interpreting the federal counterpart of Rule 55(c) make this clear.4 
In Dennis Garberg & Assocs.. Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp.. 115 F.3d 767, 
775, n.6 (10th Cir. 1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
stated, "it is well established that the good cause required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) 
for setting aside entry of default poses a lesser standard for the defaulting party 
than the excusable neglect which must be shown for relief from judgment under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)." See also, Saunders v. Morton. 269 F.R.D. 387 (D. Vt. 
2010) (recognizing the "excusable neglect" standard under Rule 60(b) as being 
"more onerous" than the "good cause" standard under Rule 55(b)). 
defense. See Davis v. Goldsworthv (Davis ID. 2010 UT App 78,18, 233 P.3d 496. 
As set forth below, federal courts generally recognize "excusable neglect" as being 
a more rigorous standard than "good cause," and the Court's recent decision in 
Roth. 2010 UT App 332, fl6, seems to clearly indicate that establishing 
"excusable neglect" is not a prerequisite to establishing "good cause." 
4
 Because Rule 55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 55(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are substantively identical, "[Utah courts] freely 
refer to authorities which have interpreted the federal rule." Miller. 825 P.2d at 
693 (citing Gold Standard. Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp.. 805 P.2d 
164, 168 (Utah 1990)). See also, Wilson v. Lambert. 613 P.2d 765, 767, n.2 (Utah 
1980) (recognizing the applicability of federal interpretations of rules that are 
nearly identical to state rules). 
7 
In Sims v. EGA Prods.. Inc.. 475 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals explained: 
Defaults may be set aside for 'good cause'. Damages 
disproportionate to the wrong afford good cause for judicial action, 
even though there is no good excuse for the defendant's inattention to 
the case. Rule 55(c) requires 'good cause' for the judicial action, not 
'good cause' for the defendant's error; as used in this Rule, the phrase 
is not a synonym for 'excusable neglect.' See Redfield v. Continental 
Casualty Corp., 818 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 1987). (Another way to 
see this is that Rule 55(c) uses the 'good cause' standard for relief 
before judgment has been entered, while referring to the standard 
under Rule 60(b) for relief after judgment. Rule 60(b) allows relief on 
account of mistake and inadvertence in addition to excusable neglect; 
the 'good cause' standard in Rule 55(c) must be easier to satisfy.) 
(emphasis original). See also. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property. 763 
F.2d 181, 183) (5th Cir. 1985) ("Although a motion to set aside a default decree 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) is somewhat analogous to a motion to set aside a 
judgment under Rule Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), the standard for setting aside a default 
decree is less rigorous than setting aside a judgment for excusable neglect."); 
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Macino. 710 F.2d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Although the 
elements for relief under Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b) are substantially the same, the 
standards are applied more stringently when considering a motion to vacate a 
default judgment under Rule 60(b)); EEOC v. Mike Smith Pontiac GMC. Inc.. 896 
F.2d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The excusable neglect standard that courts apply 
in setting aside a default judgment is more rigorous than the good cause standard 
that is utilized in setting aside an entry of default."); Hinson v. Webster Indus.. 240 
8 
F.R.D. 687 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (explaining that plaintiffs argument in favor of 
upholding the default mistakenly evaluated the legal sufficiency of defendant's 
excuse through the narrow lens of "excusable neglect," rather than the wider-
angled lens of "good cause"); Broglie v. Mackav-Smith, 75 F.R.D. 739, 742 (W.D. 
Va. 1977) ("When the issue is one of whether to set aside an entry of default so 
that the 'good cause' standard of Rule 55(c) is applicable, it is not absolutely 
necessary that the neglect or oversight offered as reason for the delay in filing a 
responsive pleading be excusable.") (italics original). 
The difference in the level of scrutiny applied to defaults under the "good 
cause" standard of Rule 55(c) and the "excusable neglect" standard of Rule 60(b) 
is an important one and is rooted in public policy. While it is well established that 
defaults are not favored, as they are not in the interest of justice and fair play (see 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962)), principles of 
justice and fair play can be tempered somewhat by competing principles of finality 
of litigation when a default judgment has been entered. In United States v. 
$22.050.00 United States Currency, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained: 
[I]t is important to distinguish between an entry of default and a 
default judgment. That is, a stricter standard of review applies for 
setting aside a default once it has ripened into a judgment. 
Specifically, once the court has determined damages and a judgment 
has been entered, the district court's discretion to vacate the judgment 
is circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and 
termination of litigation as reflected in Rule 60(b). 
9 
595 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2010) (additional citations omitted). See also, Enron 
Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that the factors 
examined in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment are more rigorously 
applied based on the concepts of finality and litigation repose). 
Because Rule 55(c) involves a less stringent standard than Rule 60(b), 
federal appellate courts apply a modified standard of review. See Coon. 867 F.2d 
at 76 ("[A] reviewing tribunal should not stay its hand if the district court errs by 
reading 'good cause' too grudgingly. Nor does 'an abuse of discretion need [to] be 
glaring to justify reversal . . . ."') (internal citations omitted). In Shepard Claims 
Serv. v. Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1986), the court stated: 
Since entry of default is just the first procedural step on the road to 
obtaining a default judgment, the same policy of favoring trials on the 
merits applies whether considering a motion under Rule 55(c) or Rule 
60(b). In practice a somewhat more lenient standard is applied to 
Rule 55(c) motions where there has only been an entry of default than 
to Rule 60(b) motions where judgment has been entered. 
(emphasis added). This approach is consistent with the view expressed in Roth 
where the court explained that because a default certificate is merely "a first step" 
towards obtaining a default judgment, the general principles which support 
granting relief from default judgments apply "a fortiori" to the appellate review of 
a trial court's decision involving default certificates. 2010 UT App 332, \ 17. 
10 
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied 
Big Bubba's Motion By Ignoring The Factors Relevant In 
Determining "Good Cause" Under Rule 55(c). 
The trial court denied Big Bubba's Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate, 
finding that Big Bubba's had failed to establish good cause or excusable neglect 
for its failure to timely answer Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. (R. 134.) The only 
basis articulated by the trial court for its decision was that "the nine-month delay 
[in answering Plaintiffs Amended Complaint] does not constitute good cause." 
(R. 197, p. 25.) The trial court further stated, "when the Court looks back at the 
factors in 60(b) which are certainly to be considered under a 55(c) analysis, the 
Court cannot find that a nine-month delay constitutes excusable neglect. And so 
the Court would deny the motion." (R. 197, p. 25.) The trial court's ruling, that a 
nine-month delay cannot constitute "good cause" or "excusable neglect," reflects a 
standard of absoluteness found nowhere in Rule 55(c) or in the cases that have 
interpreted it. 
As set forth in Big Bubba's opening brief, this Court recently identified 
several factors relevant in determining whether "good cause" exists under Rule 
55(c). Those factors include: 
[1] whether the default was willful, [2] whether the defendant alleges 
a meritorious defense, [3] whether the defendant acted expeditiously 
to correct the default, [4] whether setting the default aside would 
prejudice the plaintiff, and [5] the extent, if any, to which the public 
interest is implicated. 
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Roth, 2010 UT App 332, |16 (citing Beitel v. OCA. Inc. (In re OCA. Inc.l 551 
F.3d 359, 369 (5th Cir. 2008)) (brackets added). During the hearing on Big 
Bubba's Motion, the trial court was urged to consider the three factors most 
commonly applied by the federal courts (willfulness, meritorious defenses, and 
prejudice) in determining whether "good cause" had been shown. (R. 197, p. 7.)5 
Rather than applying the relevant factors for "good cause" under Rule 
55(c), the trial court focused solely on the amount of time that had passed since 
the filing of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint. Respectfully, Big Bubba's submits 
that this constituted an abuse of discretion. See Lund. 2000 UT 75, |9 ("A 
decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance, constitutes an abuse 
of discretion.") See also. Coon. 867 F.2d at 78 ("Abuse occurs when a material 
factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied 
upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the court 
makes a serious mistake in weighing them.") (additional citations omitted). 
In addition to not applying the relevant factors, the trial court in this case 
erred by failing to make adequate findings of facts in support of its ruling. The 
recent case, Cheap-O-Rooter v. Marmalade Square. 2009 UT App 329, 221 P.3d 
898, illustrates this point. 
5
 As indicated in Big Bubba's opening brief, the Roth decision was released 
approximately three months after the trial court had denied Big Bubba's Motion 
and identified two additional factors relevant in determining "good cause": 
expeditious corrective action and public interest. 
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In the context of the "excusable neglect" standard of Rule 60(b), the trial 
court set aside a default judgment that had been entered against the defendant. 
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the defendant had not met the standard for 
"excusable neglect." Recognizing that while trial courts have broad discretion in 
ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment, the court explained that such 
discretion is not without limits. Quoting the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81,1J55, 150 P.3d 480, the court in Cheap-O-Rooter 
stated: 
[A] district court's ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment 
'must be based on adequate findings of fact and on the law.' We 
review a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of 
review. We review a district court's conclusions of law for 
correctness, affording the trial court no deference. 
2009 UTApp 329,T|9. 
The court explained that there are four factors to consider in determining 
whether "excusable neglect" has been shown, "[i] the danger of prejudice to [the 
nonmoving party], [ii] the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial 
proceedings, [iii] the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the 
reasonable control of the movant, and [iv] whether the movant acted in good faith." 
Id. at |12. The appellate court indicated that it could not review the trial court's 
assessment of these factors because the lower court had failed to provide findings 
of fact and had failed to state a basis for its ruling setting aside the default 
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judgment. Accordingly, court found that the trial court had erred and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. IcL at f 14. 
In this case, the trial court made no findings of fact concerning its 
assessment of the factors relevant in determining "good cause" under Rule 55(c).6 
(R. 133.) Furthermore, a review of the findings of fact actually made by the trial 
court reveal that, had the relevant factors been applied, "good cause" would have 
been shown. 
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT 
AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE 
DEMONSTRATE THAT "GOOD CAUSE" EXISTS FOR 
SETTING THE DEFAULT ASIDE. 
Plaintiff contends that even if the factors relevant in determining "good 
cause" were applied in this case, these factors do not support setting aside the 
default certificate entered against Bib Bubba's. (PL's Br., pp. 9-10.) In essence, 
Plaintiffs argument asks that this Court make findings of facts which were either 
not made by the trial court or which directly contradict the findings of fact that 
were made. 
1. Big Bubba's Failure To Timely Answer The Amended 
Complaint Was Not Willful. 
Plaintiff argues that Big Bubba's failure to timely answer Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint was willful or culpable. (PL's Br., p. 11.) Quoting Meadows 
6
 Indeed, the trial court also made no findings of fact concerning the relevant 
factors articulated in Cheap-O-Rooter relating to "excusable neglect." (R. 133.) 
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v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1987), Plaintiff asserts, "[a] 
defendant's conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice of 
the filing of the action and failed to answer." (PL's Br., p. 11.) However, as set 
forth in Big Bubba's opening brief, in determining whether a defendant's conduct 
is willful or culpable, most courts look to whether the defendant's conduct was 
intentional. As observed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in TCI Group Life 
Ins. v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 2001), "[t]he usual articulation of the 
governing standard, oft repeated in our cases, is that a defendant's conduct is 
culpable if he had received actual or constructive notice of the filing of the action 
and intentionally failed to answer." (emphasis in original; internal citations 
omitted). 
In the specific context of Rule 55(c), "mere negligence or failure to act 
reasonably is not enough to sustain a default." $22.050.00 United States Currency. 
595 F.3d at 327. "[F]or the defendant to be deemed culpable for the default, he 
'must display either an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard 
for the effect of its conduct on judicial proceedings.'" Id. (quoting Thompson v. 
Am. Home Assur. Co.. 95 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1996). 
In this case, Big Bubba's failure to timely answer the Amended Complaint 
was not intentional, nor was it done with reckless disregard or an intent to thwart 
judicial proceedings. Big Bubba's was moving its business location at the time it 
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was served with the summons and a copy of the Amended Complaint. (R. 134, 
|3.) Through the mistake and inadvertence of one of its employees, the summons 
and Amended Complaint were misplaced and forgotten. (R. 134, |4.) Plaintiff 
made no attempt to controvert these facts before the trial court. Moreover, the trial 
court accepted these facts and specifically incorporated them as findings of fact in 
its Order. (R. 133-134.)7 
Plaintiffs argument that Big Bubba's inaction was the result of willful or 
culpable conduct ignores the undisputed facts of this case and the findings of fact 
made by the trial court. 
2. Big Bubba's Has Alleged Meritorious Defenses. 
Plaintiff argues that Big Bubba's "has not proven that its defenses are 
meritorious, and therefore cannot justify a reversal of the trial court's decision." 
(PL's Br., p. 13.) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argument misconstrues what is 
required to satisfy the meritorious defense standard. 
Courts applying Rule 55(c) have explained that "if any defense relied upon 
states a defense good at law, then a meritorious defense has been advanced." 
Keegel, 627 F.2d at 374. See also. United Coin Meter Co.. Inc. v. Seaboard 
Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1983). "[E]ven a hint of a suggestion 
Despite being only one of the five relevant factors to be considered in 
determining whether "good cause" exists under Rule 55(c), Plaintiffs conclusion 
that Big Bubba's acted willfully or culpably is a theme Plaintiff uses throughout 
her brief and her analysis of the remaining four factors. 
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of a defense is sufficient if proven at trial." In re William F. Antonick. 124 B.R. 
750, 754 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (internal quotations and additional citations 
omitted). "The meritorious defense component of the test for setting aside a 
default does not go so far as to require that the movant demonstrate a likelihood of 
success on the merits. Rather, a party's averments need only plausibly suggest the 
existence of facts which, if proven at trial, would constitute a cognizable defense." 
See Coon. 867 F.2d at 77 (internal quotations omitted). 
Here, Big Bubba's has alleged several affirmative defenses in its Answer 
which, if proven, would constitute cognizable defenses. (R. 43-48.) Among 
others, Big Bubba's has alleged that Plaintiffs own negligence or fault was the 
proximate cause of her injuries and damages. Big Bubba's has also alleged that the 
subject trailer was built in accordance with industry standards and is presumed to 
not be defective. See Krvzak v. Dresser Indus.. 118 F.R.D. 12, 14 (D. Me. 1987) 
(recognizing both compliance with industry standards and comparative negligence 
as meritorious defenses). 
Plaintiff has also given conflicting and contradictory accounts of how she 
was injured. As set forth in Big Bubba's opening brief, on the day of the accident, 
Plaintiff reported to medical staff at McKay-Dee Hospital that she was injured by a 
fall. (See McKay-Dee Hosp. Ctr., Emergency Dep't Report, April 2, 2007, 
attached as Ex. 10 to Pet. for Interlocutory Appeal.) Nowhere in the medical 
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records from the day of the accident does it indicate Plaintiff was injured in a 
trailer accident. In her brief, Plaintiff attempts to dismiss this point by arguing that 
when she presented at the hospital, she suffered from "headaches, confusion, and 
neck pain." (PL's Br., p. 13.) (emphasis original). Unfortunately, there are no 
eyewitnesses to the accident and no one who can independently verify Plaintiffs 
allegations of what happened. The fact that Plaintiff initially told her medical 
providers that she was injured by a fall, and then later changed her story, is 
significant for purposes of liability in this case. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Plaintiffs own safety expert, F. David Pierce, 
has expressed no opinions that would support Plaintiffs claim that this trailer was 
defectively designed or manufactured, as alleged in Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint. (R. 179-80.) Mr. Pierce's expert report focuses exclusively on 
perceived short-comings in the warnings given by Defendant Advantage Rental to 
customers who rent their trailers, and expresses no opinions directly against 
Defendant Big Bubba's. (See id.) 
Clearly, Big Bubba's has meritorious defenses that, if proven, would 
constitute defenses to Plaintiffs action. While Plaintiff asks this Court to 
summarily reject these defenses, it is important that the trial court made no 
findings whatsoever that would support Plaintiffs assertion that Big Bubba's has 
not alleged meritorious defenses in this case. (R. 133.) 
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3. Big Bubba's Acted Expeditiously To Correct The Default. 
Plaintiff argues that "[i]t is impossible to believe that [Big Bubba's] acted 
expeditiously in this case, given that it filed its motion nine months after the 
complaint was served upon it, and six months after the default certificate [was] 
entered." (PL's Br., p. 14.) (emphasis original). Plaintiffs argument fails to 
recognize that, until it received notice of the default from Defendant Advantage 
Rental, Big Bubba's had not realized its mistake in misplacing and forgetting about 
the summons and Amended Complaint. 
Big Bubba's has never denied that it was served with a summons and copy 
of the Amended Complaint. As previously indicated, at the time it was served, Big 
Bubba's was in the process of moving its business location. (R. 134, 13.) 
Through the mistake and inadvertence of one of Big Bubba's employees, the 
summons and Amended Complaint were misplaced and forgotten. (R. 134,14.) 
During the week of April 19, 2010, a representative of Advantage Rental contacted 
Big Bubba's and informed it that a default had been entered against it. (R. 134, ^  
5.) By the end of that same week, counsel for Big Bubba's had entered an 
appearance, filed an answer, and moved to have the certificate of default set aside. 
(R. 37, 39, 50, 52, respectively.) These facts have never been disputed by Plaintiff 
and were accepted by the trial court and incorporated into the findings of fact in its 
Order. (R. 133-34.) 
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Whether Big Bubba's acted expeditiously to correct the default must be 
determined based on when Big Bubba's received notice of the default. In this case, 
the undisputed facts demonstrate that Big Bubba's took immediate action to correct 
the default as soon as it discovered that a default had been entered against it. See 
Menzie v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81,169 (holding that even though sixteen months had 
passed before the defendant filed a memorandum in support of his 60(b) motion, 
defendant's motion was timely under the circumstances where defendant was 
unaware of his prior counsel's failure to file the memorandum and his new counsel 
took prompt corrective action). 
4. Plaintiff Will Not Be Prejudiced If The Default Is Set 
Aside. 
Plaintiff asserts that she "was injured over three years ago and has suffered 
multiple delays at the hand of [Big Bubba's] herein." (PL's Br., p. 16.) Plaintiff 
further asserts that she has also been prejudiced by delays caused by the appeal 
process. (See id.) Both factually and legally, Plaintiffs assertions miss the point 
of the prejudice standard under Rule 55(c). 
Factually, Plaintiff fails to recognize that while her alleged injuries occurred 
over three years ago, Plaintiff chose to wait until two years after the accident to file 
suit. (R. 1.) See Coon. 867 F.2d at 77 ("We will not infer prejudice merely from 
the passage of the amount of time involved here - especially in a case like this one, 
where plaintiff was apparently content to wait for close to a year and a half before 
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instituting suit, and then waited for over another full year between effecting 
substituted service and requesting entry of default.") Additionally, Plaintiff fails to 
recognize that from the beginning of this case, Defendant Advantage Rental has 
been actively litigating and defending against Plaintiffs claims. As such, Plaintiff 
cannot be heard to complain of any delay caused by Big Bubba's because, at least 
thus far, there has been no delay. 
Legally, courts have held that "delay in the adjudication process is not a 
sufficient basis for establishing prejudice." In re Antonick, 124 B.R. at 754. See 
also. United Coin, 705 F.2d at 845. See also, Davis v. Musler. 713 F.2d 907, 916 
(2d Cir. 1983) (holding that delay alone is insufficient; delay must result in loss of 
evidence, create increased difficulties of discovery, or provide greater opportunity 
for fraud). "[T]his definition of prejudice means that the party opposing the 
motion will no longer be able to present, or will be unduly burdened in attempting 
to present, the claim(s) advanced in the original pleadings as a result of the action, 
or more commonly the inaction, of the party against whom the default judgment 
was obtained." In re Antonick, 124 B.R. at 754 (internal quotations omitted). 
In this case, the trial court made no findings of fact that would support 
Plaintiffs assertion that she would suffer prejudice if the default against Big 
Bubba's was set aside (R. 133-34), nor could it under the circumstances of this 
case. 
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5. The Public Interest Supports Setting Aside The Default 
In This Case. 
Plaintiff argues that the public interest does not support setting the default 
aside because Big Bubba's still has an opportunity to litigate the damages portion 
of the case. (PL's Br., p. 17.) Litigating over the amount of damages only does not 
provide a full and complete opportunity for Big Bubba's to have this case decided 
on the merits. See Heathman, 377 P.2d at 190 ("The courts, in the interest of 
justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for a 
hearing on the merits of every case.") 
If the default certificate entered is not set aside, the eventual judgment 
entered against Big Bubba's will be a judgment by default and not one based on 
the merits. Judgments by default are the most severe sanction that can be imposed 
on a party in civil litigation. See Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 
12 (Utah 1995). Utah appellate courts have repeatedly expressed their disfavor of 
default judgments. See Davis I. 2008 UT App 145, f 10 ("The law disfavors 
default judgments"); Darrington v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
("[D]efault judgment is an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted out with 
caution[.]") 
In close cases, Utah trial courts have been instructed that all doubts should 
be resolved in favor of the defaulting party. See Miller, 825 P.2d at 693 ("The 
setting aside of a default under Rule 55(c) lies within the 'sound discretion of the 
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trial court, applying a standard of liberality and resolving all doubts in favor of the 
defaulting party.'") (internal citations omitted). Here, the trial court expressed that 
whether to set aside the default in this case was a "close call," but denied Big 
Bubba's Motion nevertheless. (R. 197, p. 23.) 
Allowing Big Bubba's to defend itself against Plaintiffs claims would serve 
the public interest favoring the resolution of cases based on the merits. It would 
also comport with the principles espoused in Utah appellate decisions that all 
doubts be resolved in favor of the defaulting party. 
111. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WILL CREATE 
CONFUSION AND A RISK OF INCONSISTENT 
JUDGMENTS. 
Plaintiff discounts Big Bubba's argument that the trial court's ruling will 
create confusion and a risk of inconsistent judgments by arguing that the trial court 
will be able to appropriately instruct the jury and the jury can be trusted to be 
"knowledgeable enough to understand the difference between the two defendants' 
positions in this case . . . . " (PL's Br., p. 19.) Plaintiffs argument ignores the fact 
that the defendants' positions in this case are virtually the same. 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint asserts that Big Bubba's manufactured an 
unreasonably dangerous trailer, and that Advantage Rental rented Plaintiff an 
unreasonably dangerous trailer. (R. 10, |30; R. 9, [^17, respectively.) Both Big 
Bubba's and Advantage Rental have denied Plaintiffs allegations that the trailer 
23 
was unreasonably dangerous. (R. 42, pO; R. 18, |4, respectively.) The theories of 
liability against Big Bubba's and Advantage Rental, while not identical, are largely 
the same. The damages Plaintiff seeks against Big Bubba's and Advantage Rental 
are also the same. Because of this, Big Bubba's and Advantage Rental have taken 
similar defense positions and have even retained joint experts in liability and 
damages. 
If liability is now established against Big Bubba's as a result of the default, 
the jury will likely find it difficult to understand that Plaintiff must still prove the 
trailer was unreasonably dangerous as to Advantage Rental. Such a scenario also 
creates the potential for inconsistent judgments. Despite Plaintiffs assertion to the 
contrary, this is a real danger and has caused some courts to hold that a default 
judgment cannot be maintained against one defendant if it would be inherently 
inconsistent with a judgment entered against a similarly situated co-defendant. See 
Gulf Coast Fans. Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Imps., Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 
1984) (vacating default judgment against exporter because plaintiff failed on its 
related claims against importer); In re First T.D. & Invest., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 531-
32 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[i]t would likewise be incongruous and unfair to 
allow the Trustee to prevail against Defaulting Defendants on a legal theory 




For the reasons set forth above, Big Bubba's respectfully requests that the 
decision of the trial court denying its Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate be 
reversed. 
DATED this £ f lday of March, 2011. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Andrei 
A. JoseprTSano 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Big Bubba 's Trailers 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2^day of March, 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant Big Bubba's Trailers was served 
by the method indicated below, to the following: 
W. Scott Lythgoe 
Deven J. Coggins 
Addison D. Larreau 
COGGINS, LARREAU & LYTHGOE 
289 24th Street 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Dale J. Lambert 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
15 W South Temple, #800 


















• ^ o ^ ± J fg^LV 
26 
